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Financial deregulations, Conflict of interest and banking crisis in Japan: 
A Decision-theoretic-GARCH approach to analyze the management 
behavior 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes an empirical model framework to analyze management behavior that is crucial at the outset of 
financial deregulations, and/or crisis. In a learning model setting, the proposed framework shows that management 
efficiency is a function of conditional heteroschedasticity of profitability (productivity), and it can be estimated by 
the GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986). Application of the GARCH model in analyzing management behavior 
enables to consider information theory explicitly, and it has been found effective in explaining causality of the 
Japanese banking crisis. Moreover, the paper also shows how to explain the sources of variations in the behavior of 
the bank management.  
 
1. Introduction 
If banking crisis is occurred in a financial system that is underwent financial deregulations, 
how could the causality of the crisis be explained? Is it the “conflict of interest” between the 
regulator and banks that made the situations worse with the ongoing deregulatory measures? 
How does the bank management behave in a 'conflict of interest' environment? These issues are 
examined to explain causality of the Japanese banking crisis at the outset of financial 
deregulations in the 1980s and subsequent crisis in the 1990s. This paper takes the issue “conflict 
of interest” as the potential causality of the crisis and proposes a model to capture the notion 
from the behavior of the bank-management.    
When market becomes competitive with the ongoing deregulatory measures, which also 
helps reducing operating expense and increasing net income, where are these increased 
efficiencies embodied? Is it the bank management, who makes better operating decisions with 
experience, or bank capital that is being debugged, or putting it another way- is it an ‘increased 
efficiency’ or a 'matter of conflict of interest'? Conflict of interest is a common phenomenon in 
the financial services, and it is highly prevalent when new products or deregulatory measures are 
introduced in the system.  How conflict of interest can be explained from the behavior of the 
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bank-management at the outset of financial deregulations?   
 Successful financial deregulations mostly relies on the rational behavior of the management 
of the financial institutions that depends on- how they learn from the signals of deregulatory 
policies, how is their initial beliefs and how is the standard of their own skills. If the speed of 
management’s learning process is slow but bank's profitability (productivity) is high, how the 
situation can be described? It is simply the outcome of conflict of interest. The conflict of 
interest is important because by changing the regulatory environment through interest rate 
deregulation and/or closure rule forbearance, any conflicting risk taking incentives of 
management, either through monetary policy or weaknesses of corporate governance can be 
accentuated and the degree of risk taking is increased. This risk taking behavior of the 
management can lead to a crisis. With the advent of conflict of interest, bank management can 
increase their short-term profit through costly investments, these investments can turn out to be 
non-performing if the authority corrects the conflict. If the non-performing assets are huge in 
amount, it might contribute to the crisis. 
How conflict of interest can be explained empirically and be contributed to the crisis is the 
main focus of this paper. It is the bank management who makes operating decisions based on 
their own skills as well as their learning about exogenous policy shocks. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the decision making process of the management, how much variations in 
the profitability of banks can be explained by the variations of their own skills and by variations 
of exogenous policy shocks.  
We argue that the decisions of the bank management be affected in two ways: one, by their 
own skills (here we refer skills to knowledge about bank’s capital, liquidity, profitability etc.) 
and, second, by exogenous policy shocks. Even if we consider that the skills of all banks 
management are the same, variability in productivity may be due to their learning of the signals 
of deregulatory policies. However, bank management’s decision might be optimal, but may not 
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be the best due to lack of information and knowledge, and their behavior sometimes might not be 
rational. 
This paper makes an attempt to capture the notion of conflict of interest in a modified 
Learning Model (a decision-theoretic approach), which captures the information theory explicitly 
with the introduction of the GARCH framework of Bollerslev (1986) in the model. The 
modification has been done because the conflict of interest in the financial sector cannot be 
captured through the usual learning model or regression technique very neatly. The usual 
learning model is based on decisions that have readily measurable impact on production process.  
But in the financial or banking system, management makes decisions but it is difficult to measure 
the impact of those decisions on the productivity of banks by the usual learning model, as the 
financial data are not readily available and they are interacted with many other factors. The 
detailed framework of the proposed decision-theoretic-GARCH approach is discussed in 
Section-2.   The proposed approach is termed as "decision-theoretic-GARCH approach" 
throughout the paper, and it shows that management inefficiency can be measured in terms of the 
conditional variance of banks profitability (productivity). 
The paper proceeds as follows. After introduction, Section 2 outlines the framework of the 
theory and solution of the model. Section 3 provides an overview of financial deregulations, 
conflict of interest and the Japanese banking crisis. Section 4 provides empirical results, and  
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. FRAMEWORK 
Management efficiency, Capital adequacy requirement, productivity 
During the high peak of the bubble of the Japanese economy, the authority adopted Basel 
Accord capital adequacy requirement for the Japanese banks in 1989. Some papers argue that 
these capital adequacy requirements contributed to the failure of the banks in the 1990s, some 
say it did not (for instance, see Okina, 2001, Hall, 1998, Hoshi and Patrick, 2000). At the outset 
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of the financial deregulations, banks profitability shows increasing pattern during the whole 
decade of the 1980s. Then a potential question is that when new deregulatory policies are on the 
way, and when operating costs decline with experience, where is the increased efficiency 
embodied? Is it the bank’s management that makes better operating decisions, or banks capital 
stock that is being debugged? 
The issue is important because new deregulatory policies differ widely in bank’s capital 
intensity, their complexity and so on. This is because, in Japan, most of the failed banks were 
smaller in size, e.g. the Regional Tier II, credit cooperatives etc. One thing is clear that as 
experience accumulates, the management makes better decisions.  Thus, on an abstract level, 
productivity growth can be seen as the result of a better management decision that solves some 
optimizing problem. The issue implicitly triggers the issue of corporate governance too. 
As is mentioned, in our model, skill is knowledge. At each period, the management must set 
a profitability target, must make a decision. With each repetition of the activity, the management 
makes the decision better and better.  Hence the model generates a learning curve- a positive 
relationship between experience and productivity.  
Deregulations, Conflict of interest, Asymmetry of information, Management’s decision 
Now the question, how exogenous policy (the deregulatory policy or other shocks) from the 
central authority affect the management’s decision? With a deregulatory policy, authority send a 
signal that allows the management to make a best decision, the development of skill is essential 
for narrowing the gap between actual and the best decision.   
We assume that actual decisions are optimal in that they reflect information received to date. 
But optimal decisions do not often coincide with the best decision simply because the 
management has not learned what the best decision is.  This can be described in different way. 
Suppose, the management has an initial belief about the meaning of the signal from the 
deregulatory policies, and that they learn their correct meaning in a Bayesian fashion, by 
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updating his initial believes. The learning can be a two-way track: by correcting own belief or by 
the change of policy by the regulator due to its wrong signal to the management.      
Of course, much of what may look like learning by doing is in fact the result of costly 
investments. These investments are concentrated at the outset of a liberalized system introduced. 
For example, in Japan, banks extended credit to the real estate businesses and small and medium 
enterprise (SME) market aggressively in the 1980s as a result of the outcome of deregulations to 
make the banks less dependent on big corporate customers by allowing corporations to raise their 
fund from security market in 1980.  But banks were not allowed at that time to do business in 
security markets and bond market until 1989 as a compensation of loosing big customers. By and 
large, banks aggressive behavior helped in creating the bubble, and after burst of the bubble 
these investments became non-performing due to continuing plunge of land prices (because land 
was collateral asset to banks). The decision and behavior of bank management also were affected 
by asymmetry of information as well as moral hazard problem. Therefore, it is necessary to 
include information theory explicitly to get a learning curve, what will make it different from 
deterministic learning curve. 
Banks productivity, convergence rate of learning 
We take banks profitability, the return on asset, as a measure of productivity of banks 
without loss of generality. From Figure-1, three episodes are apparent in the distribution of 
profitability of banks. 
1. Before 1980, it was declining. Slower growth in the 1970s may indicate that learning is 
optimal, and behavior is rational. 
2. After 1980, it was increasing until the late 1980s. High growth during this period indicates 
learning is optimal but behavior was irrational. Because, high money supply, monetary easing, 
lack of prudential regulations, economic upturn, overall reduced dependency of old big 
customers on bank borrowing at that time indulged bank management to extend excessive credit 
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to the growing and profitable real estate businesses as well as SME market. But behavior was 
irrational because management was supposed to have asymmetry of information, induced by 
moral hazard, and they couldn’t anticipate asset prices etc.     
3. High negative growth in the 1990s after burst of the asset price bubble. We assume that at 
that time management had realized the situation and what they did, so their decision might be 
optimal and behavior might be somewhat rational. 
Figure 1:  Profitability of the Japanese banks  (1977-2003) 
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The statistical analysis finds strong autocorrelation in the noise, reduces signal-to-noise ratio 
in the profitability. The autocorrelation function shows exponential decay. This indicates the 
learning parameter slowed, but not the profitability growth.  
 
2.1  SOLVING THE MODEL 
 
In our decision-theoretic approach, it is necessary to include information theory explicitly to get 
a learning curve. This makes it different from the deterministic learning curve. A deterministic 
curve is defined as  
[ ])t(qcb
t
qt
−=
∂
∂
,    (1) 
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where q(0) given, as q(t) is a measure of management’s efficiency or variations in productivity, b 
and c are constant while b measures the speed of learning. The problem with this equation is that 
it considers first moments only. But in fact, learning has something to do with variability of 
productivity, even among equally experienced bank management.  Therefore, second moments 
are necessary to consider in the model. Our model, based on the theme of the Bayesian learning 
model (Jovanvic and Nyarko, 1995), embodies the skewness in the distribution of efficiencies, 
and variations of efficiency. Moreover, the estimated parameters governing the speed and scope 
of learning also determine the switching cost due to policy shift of management (updating 
knowledge) or exogenous policy shock. 
We model learning in a way that abstracts from the details of the decision problem at hand. 
We assume that efficiency, q, depends on how closely a decision, z, matches an ideal level, or 
target, y.  We also assume that y is random and that the bank management must choose z before 
seeing y, and instead of learning exact value of y, the management would be learning about the 
distribution of y with known mean µ. Ideally, y is the targeted profit where z denotes the attained 
profit of banks at time t.   
We define the efficiency of management by 
qt = At [1-(yt – zt)2]                         (2) 
The maximum level of q, attainable under ideal conditions, is A. Consider, a bank management 
has to take multiple actions i= 1, 2, …..,τ-1 at time t to maximize its profit, where τ denotes the 
cumulative number of actions taken by bank management. Then the management efficiency for 
cumulative actions at t is 
( )[ ]2t,t,tt, zy1Aq τττ −−=                  (3) 
Assuming the same level of management skills, exogenous policy shock leads to a new value of 
y at period t, 
tty εµ += , for all banks (aggregate)   (4) 
tity εµ += , for specific types (cohort) of banks.                  (5) 
where ε/Ωt-1 ~ iid N(0, ht). Since we assume mean µ  is constant, variations in y is dependent on 
ht conditioned on past information set Ωt-1. Let Eτ (.) denotes the management’s expectation of 
some variable conditional on past information he has and he is risk neutral and seeks to 
maximize profit. In that case, Eτ(qt) is strictly concave in the vector of zτ,t assuming that for each 
zτ,t,  Eτ(qt) > 0. The optimal decision is therefore, 
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                                        zτ,t = Eτ(yt) = µ  = constant, for all banks    (6) 
    zτ,t = Eτ(yt) = E(µ i), variable among the same cohort of banks      (7) 
This decision is dynamically optimal as well, because the amount of information that the 
management gets does not depend on the value of  z that he chooses.  
 
From equations (3), (4) and (5), the following equation emerges 
[ ]2t,tt, 1Aq ττ ε−=             (8) 
From equations (3), (4) and (5), we also have for panel of banks, 
[ ]2
,,
))((1 titt EAq ττ εµµ −−−= .                   (9) 
This is the learning curve, which follows chi-square distribution. Then the expected efficiency 
would be 
( ) [ ] [ ]t2t,tt, h1A)(E1AqE −=−= ττ ε    (10) 
and, following (9), 
( ) [ ] [ ]tt2t,2iitt, h1A)(E))(E(E1AqE −−=−−−= νεµµ ττ              (11) 
Equations (10) and (11) can be rewritten in terms of regression equations as follows: 
( ) ξγγτ ++= t10tt, hˆA/qE                                                                  (12) 
( ) ξνγγγτ +++= t2t10tt, ˆhˆA/qE                                                        (13) 
 
From equations (12) and (13), management efficiency can be expressed as a ratio of operating 
expense over net income which depends on the conditional variance of productivity or 
profitability. 
We assume that the conditional variance ht of a time series in (10) and (11) depends upon the 
squared residuals of the process and has the advantage of incorporating heteroschedasticity into 
the estimation procedure of the conditional variance. The conditional variance can be estimated 
by means of the generalized autoregressive conditional hateroshcedasticity (GARCH) model of 
Bollerslev (1986): 
jt
p
j
j
q
j
jtjt hh −
==
−  ++=
11
2
0 βεαα    (14) 
 
where restrictions imposed are α0 > 0, αj>0 and βj>0 to ensure that the conditional variance (ht) 
is positive. In the current setting, without loss of generality, the coefficients α and β provide the 
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speed of learning and the scope of learning respectively. According to Bollerslev et al. (1992), 
the model in (14) can be viewed as a reduced form of a more complicated dynamic structure for 
the time varying conditional second order moments. Therefore, comparing (12) and (14), 
management efficiency depends on its own skills as well as how well they learn about the signal 
of exogenous policy shocks. 
If the coefficients in (12) and (13) have been found significant, the necessary next step would 
be to investigate the possible sources of variations. This can be done by fitting the following 
regression: 
t
l
lt
j k
ktj0t )C(f)I(f)p(fhˆ ωγγγγ   ++++=    (15) 
In (15), the dependent variable is the estimated conditional variance from (14). Here f(p) 
denotes the function of exogenous policy variables, f(I) denotes banking-industry related 
variables, f(C) denote the conflicting variables if any, and ω denotes error term. 
3. Financial deregulations, Conflict of interest and Japanese banking crisis: An overview 
 
The Japanese financial system is predominantly bank-based. Post-war Japanese financial 
system was highly regulated and banks were heavily dependent on Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) 
subsidies (window guidance) and borrowings of enterprise groups. The characteristics of 
Japanese model of financial system during post-war economic growth included high debt/equity 
ratios, greater reliance on bank loans than securities markets, closer relationship between banks 
and borrowers, extensive corporate cross-shareholding, greater guidance from the government in 
credit allocation etc. (see Suzuki, 1987; Ito, 1992 etc.) The system is well known as ‘main bank’ 
system 1 . It is evident from many research works that this ‘main bank’ system in Japan 
contributed greatly to the post-war high economic growth of Japan although the varieties of 
                                                 
1
 The main bank system had important historical antecedents as the pre-war banking system and industrial system 
(including Zaibatsu) evolved (Aoki and Patrick, 1994). The core of an enterprise group is usually the Main Bank. 
Group affiliation interlocks stock shares among industrial enterprises, banks and other financial institutions. The 
arrangements between main-bank and group involved both the financial and non-financial. The financial 
arrangements included the sharing financial risk through mutual support, preferential loans from the financial 
institutions and the control of stock voting power through ownership within the group. The non-financial 
arrangements included joint sale and purchase arrangements, for instance through a trading company- vertical 
integration, assured markets and sources of supply, technological affinity, combined research, and cooperative 
planning. This structure of Japanese banks might be the so-called “Industrial bank” (also available in Germany as 
House bank) rather than modern commercial bank. 
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functions played by the main bank were not usually associated with the concept of commercial 
banking. This type of Japanese banking system is characterized by clearly defined structural 
policy on the part of the government for stimulating and maintaining specialization among 
financial institutions, which has been termed as ‘convoy system’2 by some economists.  
  Unlike American and many other countries’ banks, Japanese banks are allowed to own 
equity in other corporations. The shares of group member firms owned by banks form an 
important link in the interlocking structure of enterprise groups. In addition to interlocking 
shares, banks provide preferential loans and board members to the group affiliated firms. A 
group bank serves as a screening agent for the investment projects of the group firms and stands 
ready to lend funds whenever they are needed (Hoshi et al. 1991).  
The liberalization of the Japanese financial system had been started from the mid 1970s in 
the form of financial deregulations. The main features of these deregulations were interest rate 
deregulation, relaxation of regulation to raise funds in the securities and investment market by 
firms, initiation of freely floating exchange rate, allowing banks and firms to participate in the 
capital market etc. to increase the ability of the Japanese banking system to meet international 
competition. These deregulations also aimed at dissolution of cross-shareholding3. Many have 
attributed the significant financial liberalization that has taken place to the sharp increase in 
government budget deficits in the late 1970s and the resulting need to sell large amounts of 
government bonds (see Cargill and Royama, 1988). 
The recent developments in regulatory frameworks after 1990 (right after burst of the bubble) 
allow banks to do business in the capital and risk market to increase their profit as compensation 
to the loss of main-bank customers. Under these regulatory frameworks, Japanese banks are 
                                                 
2
 Suzuki Y. (1987) used the term ‘convoy system’ of management in describing the situation of the absence of 
destructive competition through interest rate control and other regulatory measures during high growth period of 
Japan.  
3
 The Anti Monopoly Law Reform, 1977 was one-step forward in reducing cross-shareholding. Okabe (2001) shows 
that cross-shareholding is gradually reducing in the Japanese financial system.  
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allowed to do conventional non-banking activities like lease financing, investment and merchant 
banking, underwriting, insurance business etc. Thus, these types of regulatory frameworks allow 
banks to expand their businesses in risk market (security and insurance), capital market 
(investment banking) as well as money market. This model follows universal banking-type 
system rather than complete modern commercial banking. A detailed analysis of the 
deregulations and its outcome is available in Hall (1998), Sato (1999), Hoshi and Patrick (2000) 
etc. 
Let us take a note on the background of the Japanese banking crisis. With ongoing 
deregulations in the 1980s, the Japanese banks had extended credit aggressively to the real estate 
businesses, SME markets etc. that helped later on in creating asset price bubble. After 
deliberating effort of the regulator to burst the bubble in late 1989, the asset prices started to 
decline and banks assumed a huge NPL due to continuing plunge of collateralized asset prices. 
As an effort to stop banks in taking aggressive lending, authority also adopted Basel Accord of 
capital adequacy requirements in 1989. After burst of the bubble in early 1990, a decade of the 
crisis starts when many banks (180 up to 2003 according to the statistics of the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Japan) had failed, huge burden of NPL had occurred, and macroeconomic 
consequences such as deflation, recession etc. prolonged. Of the failed banks, 19 were ordinary 
banks and the rest were small credit cooperatives-type banks.   
Two questions are important regarding the causality of the crisis: (1) why did the bank 
management behave aggressively or took excessive risk in lending? And (2) why had the most 
successful banking system of the 1960s and the 1970s failed? The answer of these questions rests 
on the inconsistent deregulatory policies as well as inefficient behavior of the management that is 
also related to the weaknesses of the corporate governance of the Japanese banks. Both the 
problems created a huge conflict of interest in the financial system during the ongoing 
deregulations in the 1980s, the breed of the crisis was actually laid down at that time.  
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This conflict of interest is important because it influences bank’s risk taking behavior, and 
crisis is dependent on the degree of risk taking. Some examples of conflict of interest are 
noteworthy. The decrease of the large firms’ dependency on banks borrowing in 1980 created 
conflict of interest for the banks as no alternative was suggested. for banks as a compensation. 
Thus banks shifted aggressively their mode of investment to the real estate businesses, SMEs, 
NBFIs etc. (see Figure 2) during the whole 1980s and that was happened partly due to lack of 
prudential regulations for banks too. The aggressive investment to the SMEs and other real-estate 
sector comes through a process of asymmetry of information and moral hazard problem. Figure 2 
clearly shows that risky lending behavior of the management continues during the 1990s too, that 
can be explained by moral hazard, weak monitoring due to ownership structure, big size of banks 
etc.   
Figure 2: Growth of asset ratios over the years  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01
20
03
Year
ASSET1
ASSET3
 
* Asset1 denotes ratio of total loans outstanding over total assets  
 Asset3 denotes  the ratio of  real estate loans outstanding over total loans outstanding.   
 
Monetary policy of that time also helped the situation to become worse. Monetary easing in 
the mid 1980s along with structural changes indulged banks to expand risky investments 
aggressively which contributed to the asset price bubble of the late 1980s. At that time, money 
supply increased to more than 10% (Figure 3), and after the Plaza accord in 1987, discount rate 
was lowered to a record minimum of 2.5% from 5% within a year, 1986-87. During ongoing 
financial deregulations, growth of money supply and lowering discount rate at an extraordinary 
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level creates a room for moral hazard for the banks with the presence of deposit insurance 
provision. Although Bank of Japan is highly criticized for their policy at that time, they had not 
had much options at that time due to the then macroeconomic situations, as well as they were 
suffering from lack of coordination with fiscal authority. 
Another conflicting issue is interest rate hike during the bubble period. At that time, short-
term interest rates were higher than long-term interest rates, and lasted for a considerable length 
of time. The result was the deterioration in profitability for the banks since the long-term loans 
accumulated more losses.  Some other conflicting policies were listed in Table A of Appendix. 
But it is the bank management whose behavior is at the core of the debate. 
Figure 3:  Trend of call rate and discount rate 
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Risk taking behavior of the management can also be explained by the ownership structure of 
the Japanese banking system. Saunders et al. (1990) show that ownership structure has a more 
powerful effect on the risk characteristics of banks in periods of deregulations relative to periods 
of regulation. Because, by changing the regulatory environment such as interest rate 
deregulation, and/or closure rule forbearance, any conflicting risk taking incentives of 
stockholders and managers can be accentuated, and the degree of risk taking by stockholder-
controlled banks  increased. 
A typical Japanese bank has four groups of shareholders: life insurance companies, corporate 
borrowers of the bank, bank employees and other banks, and they constitute the top shareholders 
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of the banks (Harazaki et al., 2004). Fukao (2004) shows that life insurance companies were 
heavily dependent on banks for their funding (as of March 200, it was 2.3 trillion yen). The lack 
of incentives for shareholders of banks and as employees constitute a big portion of the 
shareholders, there is reluctance in exercising their corporate governance power over the 
management. Moreover, amakudari 4  practice, private benefits for extending risky loans, 
promotion policy on the basis of lending volume are some other issues that lead to the inefficient 
behavior of the management.  
Regarding causality of the crisis, Hoshi (2001) claimed that slow and partial financial 
deregulations created problems for the banks as they could not cope with the new environment 
while Hossain (2005) claimed that weaknesses of corporate governance of banks are mainly 
responsible for the Japanese banking crisis. Some studies claim that, the increased capital 
adequacy requirements also helped in creating the banking crisis, but Montgomery (2005) and 
some other studies showed that increased capital adequacy requirements had not had any 
significant effect on banks portfolio of investments and subsequent crisis as well. This paper 
takes "conflict of interest" in the middle of the above two thoughts to explain the causality of the 
crisis, for which behavior of the bank management is crucial. 
4. Empirical Illustrations 
In this paper I take the Japanese banking crisis case as an example to show the application of the 
proposed model framework. For this purpose, I use aggregate data for all domestically liscenced 
banks, and data sources are the Bank of Japan’s CD-ROM and Japanese Bankers Association. 
Table-1 gives the ARCH and GARCH estimates for all banks’ as well as specific types of banks’ 
profitability.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 This refers to the practice that banks provide job opportunities to retired employees of the bank that are their large 
shareholders. 
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Table 1: (G)ARCH estimates for all banks profitability (1977-2003) 
Coefficients All banks: 
GARCH(1,1) 
City banks: 
GARCH(1,1) 
Regional  
Tier I: 
GARCH(1,1) 
Regional 
 Tier II: 
GARCH(1,1) 
Trust Bank: 
GARCH(1,1) 
Long Term 
Credit Bank: 
ARCH(1,1) 
α0 0.000102 
(0.41) 
0.053 
(0.76) 
0.16** 
(1.94) 
0.0847 
(0.76) 
-0.037 
(-0.28) 
0.1815** 
(2.39) 
α1 
(ARCH 
coefficient) 
2.018*** 
(1.84) 
0.525 
(0.51) 
1.146 
(1.49) 
1.483** 
(2.20) 
-0.122 
(-0.89) 
0.97805*** 
(1.71) 
β1 
(GARCH 
coefficient)
 
0.0526 
(0.36) 
0.079 
(0.08) 
-0.292 
(-0.72) 
-0.1599 
(-0.62) 
1.286* 
(2.51) 
- 
Log-
likelihood 
13.57 -9.09 -18.68 -15.57 -11.329 -28.32 
µ  
(yt = µ +εt) 
0.2286* 
(7.92) 
0.6695* 
(9.21) 
1.91* 
(19.99) 
1.648* 
(23.62) 
0.71* 
(39.8) 
1.224* 
(77.64) 
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: * p≤ 0.01, **p≤0.05, ***p≤ 0.10; t-values are in parentheses. 
 
Significance of ARCH coefficients suggests that variability in profitability clusters for the 
Regional Tier II and LTC banks, and interesting to see that these two types of banks were the 
mostly crisis-prone banks. Moreover, it indicates that management’s learning speed was slow 
although profitability growth was very high. Plot of conditional variance in Figure 4 clearly 
shows that there was no variations in the behavior of bank management up to 1997. This 
pinpoints the ‘conflict of interest’ in the behavior of the management of these banks that led 
them to risk taking approach in lending practice. On the other hand, GARCH coefficient has 
been found significant and ARCH coefficient is  insignificant for the trust banks. This indicates 
that management’s speed and scope of learning was better, and perhaps that’s why none of these 
banks failed.    
                        Figure 4: Pattern of estimated conditional variance 
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Now let us examine the significance of estimated conditional variance on management efficiency 
according to equation (12). The results in Table 2 indicate that the conditional variance of 
profitability does not have significant effect on ME for the whole sample period 1981-2003, but 
it is highly significant for 1981-1997 and moderately significant for the period 1981-89. 
However, significance of the coefficient of ht indicates inefficiency of the management behavior. 
Therefore, two structural breaks are visible in the behavior of management: one in 1989 and 
another in 1997. These two breaks are contrasted from each other because 1989 was the year of 
bubble burst and profitability started declining and 1997 was the year of huge crisis and after that 
profitability was showing improving sign as the regulator started injecting capital and taking 
other measures. The contrast between these two points strongly implies policy inconsistency in 
the deregulation process, i.e. strong influence of exogenous policy on management behavior that 
created conflict of interest. 
The behavior analysis from the conditional variance of profitability for the period after burst 
of the bubble (1990 onward) is somewhat conditional on their behavior during the 1980s, the 
period at which the deregulatory measures were undertaken and the asset price bubble was 
created. Thus, the period of the 1980s was the most conflicting for the banks, and it takes another 
decade for the authority to correct the conflict.  
Table 2: Significance of conditional variance of profitability on bank management’s efficiency 
Dependent 
variable: 
Management 
Efficiency (q/A) 
(1) 
1981-2003 
(2) 
1981-1989 
(3)  
1981-1997 
All banks
 ME=69.20+962.31 thˆ   
(0.29)         (1.41) 
 
ME=23.26*+319.47** thˆ   
        (10.8)      (1.99) 
 
ME=  -131.75+7842.95* thˆ   
           (-1.60)    (14.27) 
 
R2 R2 = 0.086 R2 = 0.36 R2 = 0.93 
- * p<=0.00, **p<=0.10; t-values are in parentheses 
 
The model equation (12) has also been fitted for the most troubled banks- regional banks Tier II 
and the Long-term credit banks. The coefficient of ht has been found significant at 1% and 10% 
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level of significance (Table 3). This indicates inefficient behavior of the management of these 
banks. 
 
Table 3: Significance of conditional variance of profitability on troubled 
           bank management’s efficiency 
 
Dependent variable: Management 
Efficiency (q/A) 
1989-2003 
Regional banks Tier-II
 ME=1.40***+1.31* thˆ   
          (2.19)    (3.22) 
R2 = 0.29 
Long Term credit banks
 ME=11.15* - 2.49** thˆ   
         (7.22)    (-1.76) 
R2 = 0.005 
- *** p<=0.05, *p<0.01; t-values are in parentheses 
 
4.1 Sources of variations in management behavior 
Fitting the regression equation (15), the possible sources of variations in management’s risk 
taking behavior can be identified.  We consider the estimated conditional variance as dependent 
variable to proxy management’s risk taking behavior. The following independent variables might 
have strong influence in management behavior. 
Macroeconomic variables and ownership structure 
As is mentioned in Section 3, due to the ‘conflict of interest’ created during ongoing 
deregulations, excessive monetary easing, and interest rate deregulation (interest-margin) helped 
banks extend loans aggressively to real estate markets. This excessive risk taking behavior of 
management was safeguarded by weak monitoring capacity of the mostly stable ownership 
structure of banks for the period 1980-2000. On the other hand, for all banks, top five largest 
shareholders such as banks, life insurers, employees etc. constitutes on an average around 18% 
of total shares in the 1980s, and the 1990s and 20% in 2000 (Harazaki et al., 2004). So, the 
ownership structure of the banks, money supply, discount rate and interest margin are expected 
to be positively related with risk (or, conditional variance). Ownership structure of the Japanese 
banks is also an important element of weak corporate governance. 
   Deregulatory environment 
Growth of investment and securities can be considered as a direct outcome of the 
deregulations. Although late, banks were allowed to participate in short-term bond market from 
1989, which is thought as a compensation of reduced dependency of banks big customers  from 
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1980, and probably to  stop banks from risky lending. As a continuous effort, the Financial 
System Reform Act 1992, was enforced in April, 1993 that allows banks to conduct trust 
businesses either through trust bank subsidiaries or by themselves and securities businesses 
through securities subsidiaries. The Financial System Reform Law of 1998 allows banks to 
conduct insurance businesses through subsidiaries from October, 2000. As a result of these 
deregulations, the share of securities and investment increases significantly in banks portfolio 
after bubble burst in 1990 that goes against the risky behavior of the management. So, securities 
and investment should be negatively related to risk. 
Bank size 
   The larger a bank the greater should be its potential to diversify its asset risk. Alternatively, 
the larger the banking firms the more information that is likely to be collected by financial 
analyst and the lower the information risk from holding its stock (See Banz, 1981). Management 
may believe that regulators are unwilling to let larger banks fail, in which the value of implicit 
failure guarantees rise with bank size. This leads the management to take extra risk in lending 
behavior. These effects suggest that growth of size (measured by log of total asset) and risk 
taking behavior should be positively related. 
Liquidity 
Banks usually are threatened with failure because of losses on assets, and liquidity indicates the 
ability of a bank to open in spite of these losses. Excessive risky lending can make liquidity 
position vulnerable. So liquidity ratio (measured by Liquid asset/Total asset) should be 
negatively related to risky behavior. Diamond and Rajan (2005) show that aggregate liquidity 
shortage can be a cause of contagious bank failure. 
 
Capital requirements 
Capital adequacy requirement allow losses to be offset by current or past income. It acts as a 
safeguard, so management may be reluctant in taking risk. Thus capital adequacy requirement 
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(Capital reserve/Total asset) is expected to be positively related with management’s risky 
behavior. 
4.1.1 Results for all banks 
In Table 4, first two specifications of the regression model (15) are fitted just to avoid spurious 
correlation between capital adequacy ratio and average proportion of the top five large 
shareholders of banks. This is because both the variables show stability over time. Third 
specification is fitted to see the relationship between stable conditional variance (as is evident in 
Figure 4) up to 1997 and covariates. The period 1980-1997 is considered as the most 
controversial period in the financial system of Japan, and most of the failure had occurred in the 
year 1997. 
Table 4: Sources of variations in the behavior of management (all banks: 1978-2000) 
Dependent variable: 
Estimated conditional 
variance of ROA   
Specification-1 
 
Coeff. (t-value)   p 
Specification-2 
 
Coeff. (t-value)   p 
Specification-3 
(1978-1997) 
Coeff. (t-value)   p 
Money supply 
GDP growth 
Discount rate 
Interest margin 
Log(Total Asset) 
Liquidity ratio 
Capital adequacy ratio 
Growth of inv. & 
securities 
Average percentage of 
top five large 
shareholders of banks 
Constant 
0.057** (2.25)   0.05 
0.042  (0.54)    0.60 
0.10 (1.77)      0.11 
0.88 (1.76)      0.11 
11.32 (3.09)     0.01 
-19.25 (-2.19)   0.05 
 
--- 
-9.60 (-2.85)    0.02 
 
0.40 (1.97)      0.08 
 
-26.29 (-4.37)  0.001 
0.08 (2.07)     0.06 
-0.007 (-0.09)  0.93 
0.09  (1.65)    0.12 
0.86 (2.01)     0.07 
9.90 (3.02)     0.01 
-25.01 (-4.01)  0.01 
0.46  (2.13)    0.05 
 
-8.54(-2.89)    0.01 
 
-- 
 
-15.25 (-2.99)  0.01 
-0.055 (-2.02)     0.08 
0.08  (1.91)         0.10 
0.12 (2.23)          0.06 
-0.004 (-0.01)      0.98 
-7.73 (-1.90)       0.10 
-24.51 (-2.55)     0.04 
-- 
 
9.87 (2.32)         0.05 
 
-0.26 (-1.78)       0.11 
 
-0.44  (-0.08)       0.94 
 R2=0.81 
N=19 
R2=0.73 
N=21 
R2=0.81 
N=19 
* Robust standard errors are used. 
Regression results show that money supply, bank size (log of total asset), banks aggregate 
liquidity, banks ownership structure and capital adequacy ratio are significant to management’s 
inefficient or  risk taking behavior, albeit  sign is different but expected one.  Discount rate and 
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interest margin are also found moderately significant to influence management behavior. The 
significance of the variables in the third specification is same as other two specifications, but 
sign is quiet different. This indicates poor learning of the management about policy signals as the 
conditional variance was stable during the period 1980-97. 
As is discussed, during slow and partial deregulations, severe conflict of interest is apparent in 
the behavior of banks, and excessive money supply, low discount rate etc. exogenous policy 
shocks motivated them to behave speculatively as they were not effectively monitored by large 
shareholders and were complacent due to big size of banks. That is the reason why the ownership 
structure and bank size is positively significant to risky behavior of the management. 
Growth of investment and securities in the portfolio of banks is found significant but negatively 
related to the risk taking behavior of the management. Liquidity ratio is highly negatively 
significant to risky behavior, perhaps due to shortage of liquidity after burst of the bubble. 
 
Overall management behavior during the period of deregulation and crises (1980-2000) was 
found inefficient and their risk taking behavior can be explained by inconsistent monetary 
policies, delayed and partial deregulations, and weak corporate governance. Macroeconomic 
situations also indulge the management to take risky actions. 
4.1.2 Results for specific banks 
Table 5 demonstrates regression results of the equation (15) for city banks, regional banks, 
regional tier II banks, trust banks and long term credit banks (LTCB). These banks vary 
significantly in their capital intensity, business opportunity etc. Out of 19 failed banks, 15 were 
regional tier II (last failure in 2002), two LTCBs (out of 3 LTCB in 1998), one city bank  (in 
1997) and one regional bank (in 2003). No trust bank was failed.  
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Table 5: Sources of variations in the behavior of management (specific banks: 1978-2003) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Estimated 
conditional 
variance of 
ROA   
City Regional Regional-II Trust LTCB 
Money supply 
GDP growth 
Discount rate 
Interest margin 
Log(Tot. Asset) 
Liquidity ratio 
Capital ad. ratio 
Constant 
 
 
-.00060    
(-0.70) 
-.003707 
(-0.28) 
-.006193    
(-0.41) 
.0581987 
(0.50)    
.05643 
(0.55) 
-1.31049 
(-0.92) 
-.134275 
(-1.88) 
-.50907 
(-0.35)          
.0627702    
(0.88) 
-.1423434    
(-1.38) 
-.1490073  
(-1.63) 
 -.7672012    
(-0.84) 
-.5661289 
(-0.72) 
-68.83356 
(-2.05) 
.3402659 
(0.23) 
12.09603 
(1.02)           
  
.0417423    
(0.63) 
-.0757488    
(-0.66) 
-.2020154    
(-2.66) 
-.1999163     
(-0.27) 
.4671999     
(0.81) 
-6.446638    
(-1.18) 
-1.69819    
(-1.47) 
-4.030774    
(-0.56) 
-.001226    
(-0.29) 
-.0075852    
(-1.19) 
-.0078634    
(-1.20) 
-- 
 
-.0430571    
(-1.62) 
1.441843    
(5.49) 
-.0625539  
(-2.29) 
.7333022  
(2.20)      
.0332524    
(0.59) 
-.0646359    
(-0.54) 
-.073717    
(-1.41) 
-- 
 
.5646774     
(2.33) 
-20.43417    
(-2.46) 
7.83e-06    
(0.11) 
-5.766801    
(-2.00) 
R2 
N 
0.30 
24 
0.47 
24 
0.41 
24 
0.76 
27 
0.61 
27 
* Robust standard errors are used. 
Regression results show that liquidity ratio is highly negatively significant to risky behavior of 
the management for regional tier I and II, and LTCB banks, which can be thought of as 
significant determinants of failure. But for trust bank, it is significant but positive. Capital 
reserve ratio has been found negative but moderate significant for city and regional II banks, but 
highly positively significant for the Trust banks. Trust bank’s situation gives a nice comparison 
of financial situations with other failed banks. The results indicate that weak financial positions 
of the failed banks lead the management to extend risky lending to real estate and other sectors 
that finally contributed in failure. 
4.2 Does inefficiency of management have impact on banking failures?  
This is a potential question that one may ask. For this purpose, it is necessary to run an 
appropriate regression using ME as covariate. Here I may refer to another of my study (for 
instance, see Hossain (2005)) that uses Cox’s proportional hazard model to identify the 
determinants of the Japanese banking crisis which finds ME as significant to crisis.  This paper 
extends the view of that paper by providing a theoretical and empirical basis on how 
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management behaves inefficiently, and how it can be a cause of concern. Therefore, we make 
comment that management inefficiency, as a result of conflict of interest due to ongoing 
financial deregulations, might be a potential causality of the banking crisis in Japan.  
 
5. Summaries and Conclusion 
This paper provides a theoretical justification of the problems at hand- how to analyze the 
efficiency of the bank management and how to determine the sources of variations in the 
behavior of the management at the outset of financial deregulations and/or crisis. For this 
purpose, this paper extends the basic learning model to explain management’s inefficiency and 
shows that management inefficiency is a function of conditional variance of banks profitability 
(productivity). To estimate the conditional variance, it proposes to apply the GARCH framework 
of Bollerslev (1986). Application of the GARCH model in analyzing management behavior 
enables to incorporate information theory explicitly in the decision-theoretic learning model. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is a new approach that is able to explain the causality of banking 
crisis through analyzing motives and outcomes of  risky behavior of the management. 
 The proposed model framework “Decision-theoretic-GARCH” has been found effective in 
analyzing very different behavior of the bank or other financial institutions’ management at the 
outset of financial deregulations and/or other situations that had created huge conflict of interest 
in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings obtained by the proposed model framework are 
robust in the sense that these are consistent with some other early studies such as Hossain (2005), 
Hoshi (2001), Ueda (2000) etc. Moreover, the model findings capture the notion of conflict of 
interest in the Japanese financial system during ongoing financial deregulations that is thought as 
the potential causality of the subsequent crisis. The findings of this paper encompass the two 
important views of the causality of crisis- ‘slow and partial deregulations’ and ‘weaknesses of 
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corporate governance of banks’, through ‘conflict of interest’.  In that sense, the proposed model 
framework provides an adequate and systematic illustration.  
The model framework is also flexible in determining the sources of variations in the behavior 
of the management that is important for any financial system.  
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APPENDIX: 
Figure-A: Different indicators of the Japanese economy during 1964-2003 
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Table A: Agency conflicting issues 
 
Conflict Events Conflicted with Conflicting 
period 
Response by 
banks 
Comments Conflict 
1 
(Reduction of 
dependency 
on corporate 
groups) 
Removal of 
restrictions for 
corporations on 
fund raising in 
securities 
market:  
1980- onward. 
 
Objective: To 
decrease 
dependency on 
banks 
Banking 
institutions are 
allowed to 
participate in 
short-term 
government bond 
market from 
1987 (6-month 
bond) and 1989 
(3-month bond) 
[As a 
compensation to 
reduced 
dependency of 
large corporate 
groups] 
1980-87/89 
Banks did not 
find any 
alternative 
source of profit 
with decrease of 
large corporate 
groups 
dependency on 
bank during this 
period. 
Credit 
extensions to 
Real Estate 
and SME 
market 
aggressively 
Lack of 
prudential 
regulations help 
them to make a 
room for moral 
hazard 
Conflict of 
interest between 
banks and large 
corporate 
groups 
2 
(Deregulation 
of 
shareholding/ 
Corporate 
governance) 
Interlocking 
shares needed 
to be reduced to 
5% by 1987. 
Still shareholding 
are significantly 
prevalent; 
employee-
shareholders and 
non-bank 
shareholders 
have less 
influence on 
bank 
management 
1980-89 Aggressive 
credit 
extensions, 
Management 
was not 
efficient to 
anticipate 
asset price 
fluctuations 
and to find 
alternative 
mode of 
investment 
Weak corporate 
governance  
 
Conflict due to 
policy 
inconsistency 
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3 
(Monetary 
policy 
inconsistency) 
Money supply 
(M2+CD) 
started to 
increase during 
1983-89 
Interest rate 
decrease (1983-
85)(1988-89) 
1983-89 Credit 
extension to 
SMEs and 
Real Estate: 
the asset price 
bubble in 
1988-89 
During financial 
deregulation, the 
growth rate of 
money supply 
might be a 
misleading signal  
 
Time Conflict 
with fiscal 
authority 
regarding fiscal 
expansion; time 
conflict with 
implementation 
of monetary 
policy 
4   1983-85    
5 
(Monetary 
Easing vs 
Fiscal Policy) 
Monetary 
easing 
(discount rate 
lowered from 
5% to 2.5%): 
1986-87 
Fiscal expansion 
as well as banks 
Corporate 
governance 
1986-87 Credit 
extensions 
aggressively 
Asset price 
bubble started to 
emerge  
Conflict of 
monetary policy 
with fiscal and 
exchange rate 
policy 
6   1987-88  Bubble created  
7 
(Monetary 
tightening) 
Discount rate 
increased 1988-
89 
Early expansion 
of fiscal policy 
vs. monetary 
policy 
1988-89 Bankruptcy of 
creditor and 
debtor 
companies 
Bubble burst in 
1990 
Conflict of 
interest among 
financial 
intermediaries 
Note: The issues are also discussed in Section 3. 
 
 
 
 
